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	<title>Comments on: Does adding an IP address change embedded designs?</title>
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	<link>http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/2011/09/15/does-adding-an-ip-address-change-embedded-designs/</link>
	<description>Shedding Light on the Hidden World of Embedded Systems</description>
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		<title>By: OAZ @ TI</title>
		<link>http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/2011/09/15/does-adding-an-ip-address-change-embedded-designs/#comment-8378</link>
		<dc:creator>OAZ @ TI</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Sep 2011 00:43:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/?p=630#comment-8378</guid>
		<description>GSM subscriptions supporting Machine to Machine (M2M) applications are expected to reach 1 billion by 2015 (NSN estimate). So it&#039;s not only IP-connections are opening up doors ...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>GSM subscriptions supporting Machine to Machine (M2M) applications are expected to reach 1 billion by 2015 (NSN estimate). So it&#8217;s not only IP-connections are opening up doors &#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: L.R. @ LI</title>
		<link>http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/2011/09/15/does-adding-an-ip-address-change-embedded-designs/#comment-8280</link>
		<dc:creator>L.R. @ LI</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Sep 2011 16:33:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/?p=630#comment-8280</guid>
		<description>R., many embedded processors have a mechanism to control interrupt priority programmatically, allowing to set Ethernet ISR priority lower than some other time-critical ISRs. Modern Ethernet supports flow control at the MAC level, and it can be used to throttle incoming traffic when receive buffers are running low.

In VxWorks, which I have used for many years, the Ethernet ISR does very little work - it wakes up a task dedicated to processing network input and disables the interrupt, until the network task has finished processing all input. It is advantageous to be able to control the scheduling priority of this network task such that any unexpectedly high network traffic does not impact real-time critical processing. This technology has been available with VxWorks since the mid-80&#039;s, and has given it a great competitive advantage, as was the fact that it was the first RTOS to be integrated with Ethernet and TCP/IP.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>R., many embedded processors have a mechanism to control interrupt priority programmatically, allowing to set Ethernet ISR priority lower than some other time-critical ISRs. Modern Ethernet supports flow control at the MAC level, and it can be used to throttle incoming traffic when receive buffers are running low.</p>
<p>In VxWorks, which I have used for many years, the Ethernet ISR does very little work &#8211; it wakes up a task dedicated to processing network input and disables the interrupt, until the network task has finished processing all input. It is advantageous to be able to control the scheduling priority of this network task such that any unexpectedly high network traffic does not impact real-time critical processing. This technology has been available with VxWorks since the mid-80&#8242;s, and has given it a great competitive advantage, as was the fact that it was the first RTOS to be integrated with Ethernet and TCP/IP.</p>
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		<title>By: R.M. @ LI</title>
		<link>http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/2011/09/15/does-adding-an-ip-address-change-embedded-designs/#comment-8278</link>
		<dc:creator>R.M. @ LI</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Sep 2011 15:19:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/?p=630#comment-8278</guid>
		<description>Ethernet requires low-level and high-level processing. At the low level it uses interrupts, which are always high priority. At the high level you must process incoming data fast enough to avoid buffer overrun under normal conditions. Your security scheme has to manage the processing at both levels to prevent interference with higher security processes. An Ethernet storm or assault can overwhelm an unprepared system Avionics does this with partition scheduling that limits the CPU used by any one process/subsystem.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ethernet requires low-level and high-level processing. At the low level it uses interrupts, which are always high priority. At the high level you must process incoming data fast enough to avoid buffer overrun under normal conditions. Your security scheme has to manage the processing at both levels to prevent interference with higher security processes. An Ethernet storm or assault can overwhelm an unprepared system Avionics does this with partition scheduling that limits the CPU used by any one process/subsystem.</p>
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		<title>By: KER @ LI</title>
		<link>http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/2011/09/15/does-adding-an-ip-address-change-embedded-designs/#comment-8277</link>
		<dc:creator>KER @ LI</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Sep 2011 15:19:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/?p=630#comment-8277</guid>
		<description>I believe defining levels of vulnerability for each category of applications in embedded systems area will be the best, similar to the Avionics DO-178B standard that defines five levels of hazard for aviation software, giving level A to the fly-by-wire control system and the coffee machine firmware level E, cause security for oscilloscope connected over ethernet isn&#039;t that critical like an IP based surveillance camera in a chemical facility, this way we can have a common ground defining the &quot;necessity&quot; for security in embedded software.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I believe defining levels of vulnerability for each category of applications in embedded systems area will be the best, similar to the Avionics DO-178B standard that defines five levels of hazard for aviation software, giving level A to the fly-by-wire control system and the coffee machine firmware level E, cause security for oscilloscope connected over ethernet isn&#8217;t that critical like an IP based surveillance camera in a chemical facility, this way we can have a common ground defining the &#8220;necessity&#8221; for security in embedded software.</p>
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		<title>By: L.R. @ LI</title>
		<link>http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/2011/09/15/does-adding-an-ip-address-change-embedded-designs/#comment-8256</link>
		<dc:creator>L.R. @ LI</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Sep 2011 21:58:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/?p=630#comment-8256</guid>
		<description>L., you bring up a good point, the whole discussion is about a tradeoff, a compromise between cost of maintenance (e.g. upgrade) and security (i.e. the chance of malicious code modification). There is a body of knowledge in the insurance industry which knows how to express risk in monetary terms, and then put a price on it. With regards to banks and ATM networks, I am pretty sure that their equipment have always been insured, and therefore the insurance companies would the the ones to decide to allow unattended remote code update or require a physical presence of a guard or a bank clerk with authorization codes to allow any modification of the embedded software.

Karim, security does not have to be an add-on piece of software, this is a misconception arising from the PC industry. If you look at this not just as security (i.e. the protection against intentional harmful act) but as quality (protection against inadvertent malfunction or accident), you may get at a better starting point.

Here is an anecdote: many years ago a worked for an industrial equipment maker who produces machines that make use of extremely dangerous materials - they were not nuclear, but they were explosive and toxic at the same time. So in theory at least one might see those as prime targets for subversion. At the time however our main concern had been with inadvertent malfunction (i.e. quality), but the solution is equally effective for sabotage prevention. There is a tiered system of protections put in place using mechanical, electrical and software interlock mechanisms that all work with the aim to prevent any situation that may lead to an uncontrolled reaction (explosion) or leak of toxic materials. Also, these machines are networked with TCP/IP, but are only connected to isolated networks. The worst that could happen if any software element misbehaves in any way is that some production batch will be botched, or the machine will need to undergo several hours of &quot;cleaning&quot; before it can resume production, but nothing more. Electrical circuits with hard-wired logic protect the machine from any serious damage to itself or its environment, and on top of that certain extremely dangerous conditions are prevented mechanically. Of course if an authorized person sabotages the mechanical and electrical interlocks, they do not really need to hack the software or synthesize a DDoS attack to make the thing go boom.

In summary, the need for reliability and safety in embedded systems has addressed the security aspect implicitly already, in most instances. This is in contrast to the PC industry where very little attention to quality has been paid, and where the cost of an failure or accident was considered low enough to ignore.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>L., you bring up a good point, the whole discussion is about a tradeoff, a compromise between cost of maintenance (e.g. upgrade) and security (i.e. the chance of malicious code modification). There is a body of knowledge in the insurance industry which knows how to express risk in monetary terms, and then put a price on it. With regards to banks and ATM networks, I am pretty sure that their equipment have always been insured, and therefore the insurance companies would the the ones to decide to allow unattended remote code update or require a physical presence of a guard or a bank clerk with authorization codes to allow any modification of the embedded software.</p>
<p>Karim, security does not have to be an add-on piece of software, this is a misconception arising from the PC industry. If you look at this not just as security (i.e. the protection against intentional harmful act) but as quality (protection against inadvertent malfunction or accident), you may get at a better starting point.</p>
<p>Here is an anecdote: many years ago a worked for an industrial equipment maker who produces machines that make use of extremely dangerous materials &#8211; they were not nuclear, but they were explosive and toxic at the same time. So in theory at least one might see those as prime targets for subversion. At the time however our main concern had been with inadvertent malfunction (i.e. quality), but the solution is equally effective for sabotage prevention. There is a tiered system of protections put in place using mechanical, electrical and software interlock mechanisms that all work with the aim to prevent any situation that may lead to an uncontrolled reaction (explosion) or leak of toxic materials. Also, these machines are networked with TCP/IP, but are only connected to isolated networks. The worst that could happen if any software element misbehaves in any way is that some production batch will be botched, or the machine will need to undergo several hours of &#8220;cleaning&#8221; before it can resume production, but nothing more. Electrical circuits with hard-wired logic protect the machine from any serious damage to itself or its environment, and on top of that certain extremely dangerous conditions are prevented mechanically. Of course if an authorized person sabotages the mechanical and electrical interlocks, they do not really need to hack the software or synthesize a DDoS attack to make the thing go boom.</p>
<p>In summary, the need for reliability and safety in embedded systems has addressed the security aspect implicitly already, in most instances. This is in contrast to the PC industry where very little attention to quality has been paid, and where the cost of an failure or accident was considered low enough to ignore.</p>
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		<title>By: L.H. @ LI</title>
		<link>http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/2011/09/15/does-adding-an-ip-address-change-embedded-designs/#comment-8255</link>
		<dc:creator>L.H. @ LI</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Sep 2011 21:57:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/?p=630#comment-8255</guid>
		<description>Physical security is great, but not always practical. For example, large banks have thousands of ATM machines in the field and it is not practical to send a tech and a guard out to each branch to enable firmware upgrades to the equipment. This is where certificate based sucurity schemes are used to enable pushing firmare updates to the field.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Physical security is great, but not always practical. For example, large banks have thousands of ATM machines in the field and it is not practical to send a tech and a guard out to each branch to enable firmware upgrades to the equipment. This is where certificate based sucurity schemes are used to enable pushing firmare updates to the field.</p>
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		<title>By: A.A. @ LI</title>
		<link>http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/2011/09/15/does-adding-an-ip-address-change-embedded-designs/#comment-8254</link>
		<dc:creator>A.A. @ LI</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Sep 2011 21:57:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/?p=630#comment-8254</guid>
		<description>Any system that relies strictly on software security for protection can and will be compromised at some point in time. This is where mechanical conditioning works as a safeguard that many motherboards have on them to prevent someone from overwriting the BIOS of a PC without the user&#039;s authorization. On mine I have to move a jumper to allow the programming. In the case of an automobile this would prevent someone from remotely tampering with the vehicles operation by requiring something as simple as the throwing of a programming allowed switch, although I would hope it would require some more secure form of authorization.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Any system that relies strictly on software security for protection can and will be compromised at some point in time. This is where mechanical conditioning works as a safeguard that many motherboards have on them to prevent someone from overwriting the BIOS of a PC without the user&#8217;s authorization. On mine I have to move a jumper to allow the programming. In the case of an automobile this would prevent someone from remotely tampering with the vehicles operation by requiring something as simple as the throwing of a programming allowed switch, although I would hope it would require some more secure form of authorization.</p>
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		<title>By: R.M. @ LI</title>
		<link>http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/2011/09/15/does-adding-an-ip-address-change-embedded-designs/#comment-8253</link>
		<dc:creator>R.M. @ LI</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Sep 2011 21:56:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/?p=630#comment-8253</guid>
		<description>You are less secure than you think and only as secure as you can prove. This issue is addressed in a more formal way with ISA-99 (Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security). http://www.isa.org/MSTemplate.cfm?MicrositeID=988&amp;CommitteeID=6821 . Homeland Security wants to see all control systems, especially for critical infrastructure, become more robust and resistant to assaults (or accidents).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You are less secure than you think and only as secure as you can prove. This issue is addressed in a more formal way with ISA-99 (Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security). <a href="http://www.isa.org/MSTemplate.cfm?MicrositeID=988&amp;CommitteeID=6821" rel="nofollow">http://www.isa.org/MSTemplate.cfm?MicrositeID=988&amp;CommitteeID=6821</a> . Homeland Security wants to see all control systems, especially for critical infrastructure, become more robust and resistant to assaults (or accidents).</p>
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		<title>By: KER @ LI</title>
		<link>http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/2011/09/15/does-adding-an-ip-address-change-embedded-designs/#comment-8252</link>
		<dc:creator>KER @ LI</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Sep 2011 21:56:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/?p=630#comment-8252</guid>
		<description>I agree with the idea of security in embedded systems and specially when it comes to connectivity over a network either public one or private, but shouldn&#039;t be our main concern right now, cause security applications usually &quot;memory hungry&quot; and embedded systems you don&#039;t have the privilege of large memory or buffers to play with, beside as I mentioned previously that network traffic with the embedded device can be easily monitored for intrusion/strange data transfers and/or resources usage on the embedded device, locks in the application layer of the embedded device can be efficient and low cost/resources solution.

On the other hand to protect networks that monitors and/or controls high importance systems like a network of controllers inside nuclear reactor or even the car network the best way is to run the security application (e.g. firewall) through the main server and let it responsible of the intrusion protection, will reduce both computation load and resources management at the embedded device side, one other option is to isolate networks of strategic sensitivity (national security related projects, infrastructure) from global and public networks to minimize the risks of intrusion/viruses/malware/hacking, thats safer and preferable solution by many organizations.

My point is to try to minimize the network security load required from the embedded device and save resources cause the risks that endanger networked embedded devices aren&#039;t the highest concerns and priorities in the current world cyberspace security or embedded systems, however I claim its important as you said from long term aspect.

cheers :)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree with the idea of security in embedded systems and specially when it comes to connectivity over a network either public one or private, but shouldn&#8217;t be our main concern right now, cause security applications usually &#8220;memory hungry&#8221; and embedded systems you don&#8217;t have the privilege of large memory or buffers to play with, beside as I mentioned previously that network traffic with the embedded device can be easily monitored for intrusion/strange data transfers and/or resources usage on the embedded device, locks in the application layer of the embedded device can be efficient and low cost/resources solution.</p>
<p>On the other hand to protect networks that monitors and/or controls high importance systems like a network of controllers inside nuclear reactor or even the car network the best way is to run the security application (e.g. firewall) through the main server and let it responsible of the intrusion protection, will reduce both computation load and resources management at the embedded device side, one other option is to isolate networks of strategic sensitivity (national security related projects, infrastructure) from global and public networks to minimize the risks of intrusion/viruses/malware/hacking, thats safer and preferable solution by many organizations.</p>
<p>My point is to try to minimize the network security load required from the embedded device and save resources cause the risks that endanger networked embedded devices aren&#8217;t the highest concerns and priorities in the current world cyberspace security or embedded systems, however I claim its important as you said from long term aspect.</p>
<p>cheers <img src='http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
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		<title>By: A.M. @ LI</title>
		<link>http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/2011/09/15/does-adding-an-ip-address-change-embedded-designs/#comment-8251</link>
		<dc:creator>A.M. @ LI</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Sep 2011 21:56:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.embeddedinsights.com/channels/?p=630#comment-8251</guid>
		<description>@K.: Your logic is correct but only for short term applications. This approach to design is very dangerous. It is much easier and cheaper to patch a security hole in a PC or hand-held device like a cell phone or PDA than in smaller embedded system. Think cyber-warfare and attacks against national infrastructures. Think hijacking your car critical systems via blue-tooth access to its network. The latter had only one known kind of attach known to me - car whispers - so far without major impact as they were only to break into car audio system since it was the only one on blue-tooth network. /* OK, blue-tooth is not IP but it is a short range wireless network with its own protocol stack too. */</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@K.: Your logic is correct but only for short term applications. This approach to design is very dangerous. It is much easier and cheaper to patch a security hole in a PC or hand-held device like a cell phone or PDA than in smaller embedded system. Think cyber-warfare and attacks against national infrastructures. Think hijacking your car critical systems via blue-tooth access to its network. The latter had only one known kind of attach known to me &#8211; car whispers &#8211; so far without major impact as they were only to break into car audio system since it was the only one on blue-tooth network. /* OK, blue-tooth is not IP but it is a short range wireless network with its own protocol stack too. */</p>
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